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Raising an Army: The Geopolitics of Militarizing the Lives of Working-Class Boys in 
an Age of Austerity  
 
Abstract: This article examines the political and social impact of elevating military 
values in society in a context of austerity. Centring on discussions around two British 
GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt ͚military ethos͛ iŶitiatiǀes, I consider the idea that military service instils 
desirable qualities and values in military personnel, making them well-suited to 
educating and socialising children, to the advantage of both children and society. 
Arguing that these schemes primarily target boys from disadvantaged backgrounds 
in an effort to turn them iŶto ͚pƌoduĐtiǀe͛ ŵeŵďeƌs of soĐietǇ, I suggest that military 
ethos initiatives not only ĐoŶtƌiďute to the ͚ƌaisiŶg͛ of working-class boys but the 
raising of a class-based Army.  Moreover, rather than focusing solely on the 
implications of the military ethos in the British context, I argue that its underlying 
assumptions about military socialisation as a social good have significant geopolitical 
effects. Through characterising the military as a core institution of society and its 
values as moral and good for children, these initiatives oďsĐuƌe the ŵilitaƌǇ͛s Đoƌe 
violent functions. Thus by both normalising violence and militarism in everyday life 
and targeting boys from disadvantaged backgrounds, military ethos initiatives 
engender the subjectivities that provide the very political, social economic, and 
indeed, practical resources that  make war possible.  
 
Key words: austerity; militarism; geopolitics of the everyday; military ethos;; gender, 
race and class 
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Making sense of war requires understanding the multiplicity of practices, 
materialities and logics that animate it. As Jabri (2006:49) argues, our contemporary 
knowledge of the world is constructed and materialised through a global war on 
terror, which has permeated ͞the ŶoƌŵalitǇ of the politiĐal pƌoĐess͟ and produced a 
͞ŵutually reinforcing relationship betweeŶ gloďal aŶd loĐal ĐoŶditioŶs͟ (Jabri 2006: 
ϱϬ, ϱϮͿ. AĐĐoƌdiŶglǇ, ouƌ aŶalǇses of ǁaƌ ŵust tƌaǀeƌse ͞sĐales fƌoŵ the 
ŵaĐƌoseĐuƌitǇ of states to the ŵiĐƌoseĐuƌitǇ of people aŶd theiƌ hoŵes͟ ;HǇŶdŵaŶ 
2007: 36) and consider how they can be mutually co-constitutive. By focusing on the 
eǀeƌǇdaǇ pƌaĐtiĐes aŶd logiĐs suƌƌouŶdiŶg the Bƌitish goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s ageŶda to 
entrench something called the ͚ŵilitaƌǇ ethos͛ iŶ schools, this article considers how 
this agenda, as a pƌaĐtiĐe of Ŷeoliďeƌal goǀeƌŶŵeŶtalitǇ, ǁhiĐh ͞has the populatioŶ 
as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of 
seĐuƌitǇ as its esseŶtial teĐhŶiĐal iŶstƌuŵeŶt͟ ;FouĐault ϮϬϬϳ: ϭϬϴͿ, facilitates war 
and militarism in an age of austerity. Following Jessop (2007: 36), I propose analysing 
͞poǁeƌ ǁheƌe it is eǆeƌĐised oǀeƌ iŶdiǀiduals͟ and social groups, in order to better 
uŶdeƌstaŶd hoǁ ͞diǀeƌse poǁeƌ ƌelatioŶs Đoŵe to ďe ĐoloŶized aŶd aƌtiĐulated iŶto 
more general meĐhaŶisŵs that sustaiŶ ŵoƌe eŶĐoŵpassiŶg foƌŵs of doŵiŶatioŶ͟. 
More specifically, I explore how military ethos initiatives contribute to recruitment 
into the armed forces and promote popular support for war by presenting the 
military, its practices and its personnel as socially and economically productive. I 
demonstrate this by considering how military ethos initiatives have emerged in a 
wider social context of austerity in which it is imperative to make working-class boys 
economically and socially productive.    
 
The current British Conservative government has been advocating and funding 
military ethos initiatives since it was a coalition partner in 2010. Though not 
comprehensively defined, broadly speaking, the military ethos refers to the idea that 
certain values and qualities are inherent to military personnel and veterans, as a 
direct result of their military socialisation oƌ ͚ƌaisiŶg͛ and service. As former 
Education Secretary, Michael Gove, Đlaiŵed ͞[e]very child can benefit from the 
values of a military ethos. Self-discipline and teamwork are at the heart of what 
makes our armed forces the best in the world - and are exactly what all young 
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people Ŷeed to suĐĐeed͟ ;DfE ϮϬϭϮͿ. Thus, ďased oŶ a seƌies of assumptions about 
the social and educational value of military service, large amounts of Ministry of 
Defence (MoD) and Department for Education (DfE) funds1 have been committed to 
military ethos initiatives. These include two schemes which form a focus for my 
discussion: employing veterans to ͞iŵpƌoǀe eduĐatioŶal aĐhieǀeŵeŶt aŵoŶg pupils 
diseŶgaged ǁith eduĐatioŶ͟ iŶ alteƌŶatiǀe pƌoǀisioŶ2 (hereafter AP) (DfE 2012)3 at a 
cost of around £8.2m to date; and Troops to Teachers (hereafter T2T) which fast-
tracks veterans, including some without degrees, into teacher training, which has 
attracted over £10m in government funding so far4.  
 
In an ͚age of austeƌitǇ͛, such allocation of state resources perhaps warrants even 
greater scrutiny than usual. Austerity measures are based on the neoliberal 
conviction that the market should be centred to maximise individual freedom. In the 
UK, austerity invokes the ͚ďlitz spiƌit͛ of ǁaƌtiŵe sĐaƌĐitǇ, aiming to ͞gaƌŶeƌ puďliĐ 
support for the reduction or withdrawal of welfare entitlements through appeals to 
frugality, self-suffiĐieŶĐǇ aŶd fisĐal pƌudeŶĐe͟ ;MaĐLeaǀǇ ϮϬϭϭ: ϯϱϱͿ. As Kiersey 
(2009: 385; see also Foucault 2008) argues, subjects are produced through this 
legitiŵatioŶ of ͞ŵaƌket-ďased teĐhŶologies͟; a subject ǁhose ͞fiƌst ƌespoŶsibility is 
to the reproduction of itself as the rational, capital-bearing subject of Homo 
oeconomicus […] a suďjeĐt ǁho aĐĐepts that the ͚ƌules of the gaŵe͛͟ oďlige heƌ oƌ 
hiŵ to ͞Đoŵŵit foƌĐefullǇ to the iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶt of his oǁŶ huŵaŶ Đapital aŶd positioŶ 
iŶ the ŵaƌket͟.  
                                                 
1 Another key military ethos initiative is the expansion of cadet forces in state-funded schools. In 
2012, £10.85m was pledged for 100 new units by 2015. A further £1m was pledged in June 2014 and 
iŶ ϮϬϭϱ͛s suŵŵeƌ ďudget, a further £50 million was allocated to create 500 new cadet units by 2020, 
despite indications that the original aim of 100 by 2015 has not been met (Scott 2015). Much military 
ethos funding has come from LIBOR fines which were imposed by the government on British banks for 
their attempts to manipulate this benchmark inter-bank borrowing rate. Some private match-funding 
has also been provided.  
2 Alternative provision herein refers to education arranged by schools or local authorities for pupils 
who have been excluded or who have been directed to off-site provision to improve their behaviour 
(see DfE 2013) 
3 In 2011, £1.5m was allocated to groups that enabled ex-seƌǀiĐe peƌsoŶŶel to ͞use the skills aŶd 
eǆpeƌieŶĐe gaiŶed oŶ the fƌoŶtliŶe to help ǇouŶg people aĐhieǀe͟, espeĐiallǇ those deeŵed 
͞disadǀaŶtaged͟ aŶd ofteŶ iŶ ƌeĐeipt of fƌee sĐhool meals (DfE 2011). In 2012, a further £1.9m was 
awarded and in 2014, a further £4.8m, to similar schemes.   
4 Approximately £2m has already been spent on T2T and a consortium of universities has won a 
further £8.7m tender for extending the scheme from February 2015 to September 2018 (Nye 2014).      
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Military ethos initiatives are an example of such market-based technologies of 
neoliberal governmentality. Whilst cutbacks have been made throughout the state 
apparatus, including to education, substantial funding has been allocated to military 
ethos initiatives, primarily to enhance state-schooling. Putting services out to tender 
is a common neoliberal practice that pits the market against investing in the 
supposedly ͚inefficient͛ public sector (Means 2013). Military ethos initiatives 
problematize state-schools and teachers, not decades of disinvestment, for ͚failiŶg͛ 
to instil proper standards of discipline (Means 2013) and as such, constitute 
education and subjects consistent with neoliberalism though militarised practices. 
Through an emphasis on martial values such as self-discipline, education becomes a 
commodity through which appropriately self-reliant, economically productive 
subjects can be made.  
 
Though the ͚ŵilitaƌǇ ethos͛ is ƌaƌelǇ defiŶed suďstaŶtiǀelǇ ďǇ its pƌopoŶeŶts, ŵilitaƌǇ 
service has long been regarded as a resource of social capital on the grounds that as 
servants of the state, soldiers necessarily serve others over themselves (Coker 2007: 
ϭϯϰͿ. Milehaŵ ;ϭϵϵϴ: ϮϯϴͿ fuƌtheƌ aƌgues that the ŵilitaƌǇ͛s ethos of self-sacrifice is 
distiŶĐt fƌoŵ the ͞Đult of iŶdiǀidualisŵ͟ that supposedly characterises civilian life. 
This leads some to suggest that soldiers not only ͞eleǀate the ĐolleĐtiǀe good over 
iŶdiǀidual Ŷeeds͟ ďut aĐĐoƌdiŶglǇ ͞Đleaǀe to higheƌ ŵoƌal staŶdaƌds͟ thaŶ ĐiǀiliaŶs 
(Strachan 2003: 50). It is this supposed moral superiority that military ethos 
proponents believe makes veterans valuable in schools.  Socially productive moral 
heroes require unproductive immoral villains though, and military ethos initiatives 
ƌeƋuiƌe ͚ǁoƌkiŶg-Đlass ďoǇs͛, iŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ, to iŵpƌoǀe. As TǇleƌ ;ϮϬϬϴ: ϭϴͿ eǆplaiŶs, 
soĐial aŶǆieties fƌeƋueŶtlǇ giǀe ƌise to figuƌes suĐh as the ͚ǁoƌkiŶg Đlass ďoǇ͛ ǁhiĐh 
not oŶlǇ deŵoŶise ďut also ͞attƌiďute supeƌioƌ foƌŵs of soĐial Đapital to the suďjeĐt 
positioŶs aŶd soĐial gƌoups theǇ aƌe iŵpliĐitlǇ oƌ eǆpliĐitlǇ diffeƌeŶtiated fƌoŵ͟.  
 
UK Government plans to introduce the T2T programme were first announced as part 
of a government commitment to raise the quality of new entrants to the teaching 
profession. This needs to be understood in a wider political and social context 
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though where there is increasing concern over UK educational standards and t the 
perceived ͚aŶtisoĐial͛ ďehaǀiouƌ of sĐhool-age children, particularly boys (Dermott 
2012). Veterans have been posited as a potential ͚solution͛ to this social problem, yet 
the White Papeƌ does Ŷot ĐlaƌifǇ ǁhǇ; it siŵplǇ Ŷotes that ǀeteƌaŶs ͞haǀe a gƌeat 
deal to offer young people as ŵeŶtoƌs͟ ;DfE ϮϬϭϬ: ϮϮͿ. IŶdeed, as ǁith otheƌ ŵilitaƌǇ 
policies, the military ethos and its perceived benefits are never fully explicated by its 
proponents. It is, I would suggest, this very vagueness that makes it more malleable 
and thus politically useful (Ingham 2014); and it is the political effects of knowledge 
claims about the military ethos, however vague, that interest me.  
 
The rhetoric of aspiration and social mobility also dominates in the self-reliant age of 
austerity. BeĐoŵiŶg ͚upǁaƌdlǇ ŵoďile͛ depeŶds oŶ aspiƌiŶg to improve; on caring for 
oneself aŶd ĐoŶǀeƌtiŶg ͞ouƌ lookiŶg fƌoŵ the outside…toǁaƌds oŶeself͟ ;FouĐault 
2005: 11). The idea that individuals should be responsible foƌ ͚iŵpƌoǀiŶg their lot͛ is 
precisely what has led ŵaŶǇ to aĐƋuiesĐe to the ͞shaƌp distiŶĐtioŶs of ǁealth aŶd 
poǁeƌ͟ that exist in society and to accept austerity as a rational course (Reay 2013: 
665). Whilst proponents of the military ethos argue it will improve the life-chances of 
͞ǇouŶg people, ofteŶ fƌoŵ soŵe of the ŵost disadǀaŶtaged ďaĐkgƌouŶds͟, by 
iŶstilliŶg ͞disĐipliŶe, self-ƌespeĐt aŶd a seŶse of puƌpose͟ iŶ theŵ ;Goǀe iŶ DfE ϮϬϭϭͿ, 
as Reay (2013) argues, children from disadvantaged backgrounds lack advantages, 
not purpose. The interweaving of disadvantage with a lack of discipline, self-respect 
and drive is thus a pƌaĐtiĐe of ͞Đlass ŵakiŶg͟ ;TǇleƌ ϮϬϬϴ: ϭϴͿ. By virtue of  
͚ďeloŶgiŶg͛ to  soĐial gƌoups characterised by dependency and a lack of care for the 
self, those from ͚disadǀaŶtaged ďaĐkgƌouŶds͛, not wider socio-economic conditions 
of possibility, are constituted as problems needing to be solved.  
 
As I will argue, it is through such class-making that military ethos initiatives can 
eŶĐouƌage ͚ǁoƌkiŶg-Đlass͛ ĐhildƌeŶ to swap formal qualifications for skills especially 
well-suited to serving in the lowest, and often most dangerous, military ranks. By 
reinforcing the military as a site of opportunity - in some cases the only site - military 
ethos initiatives may ensure that the most vulnerable, and often least politically 
enfranchised, continue to fight and die in disproportionate numbers. As 
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ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ geopolitiĐs is Ŷoǁ aƌguaďlǇ ͞less aďout stakiŶg teƌƌitoƌial Đlaiŵs thaŶ 
aďout seĐuƌiŶg aĐĐess to ŵaƌket eǆpaŶsioŶ͟ ;Gilďert 2015: 215), societǇ͛s least 
productive subjects can be made productive by war.  
 
Military ethos initiatives also normalise the military, the state͛s ŵeĐhaŶisŵ foƌ 
violence, in everyday life. By constituting the military as a core institution of society 
aŶd its ǀalues as ŵoƌal aŶd good foƌ BƌitaiŶ͛s ĐhildƌeŶ, its Đoƌe ǀioleŶt fuŶĐtioŶs aƌe 
oďsĐuƌed. This, I aƌgue ĐaŶ fosteƌ ŵilitaƌisŵ, defiŶed heƌeiŶ as the ͞ǀeŶeƌatioŶ of 
military values and appearances in excess of what is strictly necessary for effective 
defeŶĐe͟ ;“tƌaĐhaŶ ϭϵϵϳ: 264-265). Although militarism can emerge from military 
objectives and priorities seeping into civilian life, importantly, militarism also 
eŵeƌges fƌoŵ ͞ŶoŶ-state actors behaving in non-oƌĐhestƌated ǁaǇs͟ ;JeŶkiŶgs et al 
2012: 357). Thus, to better understand how military violence is made possible we 
ŵust, to paƌaphƌase Lutz ;ϮϬϬϲͿ, ďe ŵiŶdful that ͚ǁaƌ is iŶ the details͛. EǀeƌǇdaǇ life 
is a significant site ǁheƌe ͞geogƌaphiĐal kŶoǁledge aďout the ǁoƌld is ďeiŶg 
produced, reproduced aŶd ŵodified͟ ;O͛Tuathail & AgŶeǁ ϭϵϵϮ:ϭϵϱͿ.  
 
In the sections that follow I therefore examine the inter-weavings of, schooling, 
gender, race, class, austerity and an ontology of war that traverses scales, to 
ĐoŶsideƌ hoǁ the ŵilitaƌiziŶg of ĐhildƌeŶ͛s lives can animate war. In the first section I 
examine the politics of austerity and militarism that have allowed military ethos 
initiatives to emerge and be discursively constructed as a panacea for perceived 
social ills. The second and third sections then explore some of the most significant 
geopolitical implications of the military ethos. Firstly I consider how military ethos 
iŶitiatiǀes diƌeĐtlǇ ĐoŶtƌiďute to BƌitaiŶ͛s aďilitǇ to ǁage ǁaƌ thƌough laďouƌ 
exploitation of working-class boys in an age of austerity. Following on from this, I 
then aim to show how military ethos initiatives, and their underlying assumptions 
about the desirability of military service as a social good, normalise the military and 
its violence in everyday life to facilitate militarism. I conclude by suggesting that all 
this emphasises the importance of considering how war, often regarded a macro 
geopolitical practice, is made possible by enactments and negotiations of militarism 
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and violence in everyday life (Basham 2013; Gray 2016; Hyde 2016), including those 
often neglected forms that target children in the Global North (Beier, ed. 2011). 
 
Gender, Race, Class and Militarised ͚Solutions͛ 
The original T2T programme arose in the United States where state-schooling is a 
recurring source of social anxiety, particularly iŶ eupheŵistiĐ ͚uƌďaŶ͛ sĐhools, ǁheƌe 
mostly impoverished, non-white children are educated (Means 2013). In the UK, 
social anxiety similarly focuses on the need to target ͚iŶŶeƌ-ĐitǇ͛ sĐhools, teƌŵiŶologǇ 
that evokes both classed and racialized images of potentially dangerous youths for 
the British public (Chadderton 2014). The social and political obsession with young 
people, particularly boys, being raised without father-figures, is often racially coded 
as a prevalent problem among poorer families of African-Caribbean heritage; 
educational underachievement among certain minority-ethnic groups also often 
receives disproportionate media attention (Chadderton 2014). Concerns are similarly 
raised about white underprivileged children (House of Commons Education 
Committee 2014) but the racial coding differs; white children are not supposed to 
fail.  
 
. As Dermott (2012: 224) points out, whilst evidence on the significance of gender to 
educational attainment is inconclusive, ͞populist and political commentators still 
continue to lament the fate of boys vis-a-ǀis giƌls͟, whatever their race. ͚BaĐklash͛, 
social indicators of growing resentment towards women and the feminist 
movement, fuelled by the conviction that the (albeit limited) progress of women 
sigŶifies iŵpeŶdiŶg ͞ŵasĐuliŶe dooŵ͟, is evident here (Faludi 1992:13). The oft 
touted solution is that more male teachers in classrooms will offer struggling boys 
positive role models. Many austerity measures rely on the enduring assumption that 
men are primary wage-eaƌŶeƌs, suppoƌted ďǇ ǁoŵeŶ͛s seĐoŶdaƌǇ ǁages; this ofteŶ 
makes women much more reliant on benefits and tax credits to supplement their 
incomes than men, and more vulnerable as these services are cut (MacLeavy 2011). 
This gendering could partly account for the emphasis in military ethos initiatives of 
gettiŶg ŵale ǀeteƌaŶs iŶto ͚iŶŶeƌ-ĐitǇ pƌoďleŵ sĐhools͛ to ƌehaďilitate ͚ǁoƌkiŶg-class 
ďoǇs͛. MeŶ aƌe expected to be productive and women, re- and/or less productive. 
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These expectations fuel the assumption that men are best-placed to provide 
qualities otherwise omitted from education and these also infuse military ethos 
initiatives. For example, former Education Minister, Michael Gove (2011), argued 
that T2T was being launched in the UK:  
 
͞speĐifiĐallǇ iŶ oƌdeƌ to eŶsuƌe that theƌe aƌe ŵaŶǇ ŵoƌe ŵale ƌole ŵodels 
eŶteƌiŶg teaĐhiŶg… PƌofessioŶals ǁho haǀe deǀoted theiƌ liǀes to tƌaiŶiŶg 
young men and women in uniform will have the chance to intervene earlier in 
the lives of those they are best equipped to help͟.  
 
Similarly,  a report on T2T by the Centre for Policy Studies, a right-wing think tank 
founded by Sir Keith Joseph and Margaret Thatcher in 1974,  asserts that iŶ ͚iŶŶeƌ-
ĐitǇ sĐhools͛:  
 
͞eǆ-servicemen could have a profound effect on discipline and learning. This 
is not merely because ex-servicemen are sure of their own moral authority. 
They are not intimidated by adrenaline-fuelled adolescents: they have, unlike 
ŵost teaĐheƌs, ďeeŶ theƌe ďefoƌe͟ ;Buƌkaƌd ϮϬϬϴ: ϳͿ.  
 
Enloe (2000: 289) argues that militaries and militarised practices frequently privilege 
ŵasĐuliŶitǇ ďut theǇ do so ͞ďǇ ŵaŶipulatiŶg the ŵeaŶiŶgs of ďoth feŵiŶiŶitǇ aŶd 
ŵasĐuliŶitǇ͟. For example, in the UK military women are, at the time of writing, 
excluded from close-combat roles. A blanket ban exists on the grounds that all 
women, by virtue of being women, pose a potential threat to unit cohesion.  It is 
assumed that men will react more emotionally to the injury or death of a woman 
than a man, and that women will provoke sexual competition among men in a unit. 
In both cases, men and women are characterised as having innate characteristics and 
biological urges. This maintains the normality of ǁoŵeŶ͛s eǆĐlusioŶ fƌoŵ the 
Infantry, regardless of individual merit, and confirms that only men are up to 
carrying out the ŵilitaƌǇ͛s primary function (Basham 2009; 2013).  Even though 
various scholars have shown that gendered and sexualised practices within militaries 
aƌe iŶ faĐt ͞stƌuĐtuƌed ďǇ ĐoŶtƌadiĐtioŶ͟ ;BelkiŶ ϮϬϭϮ: ϰ; CoŶŶell ϭϵϵϱ; Bulŵeƌ ϮϬϭϯͿ, 
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military policy tends to ďe plagued ďǇ ͞iŶeƋualities that aƌe the pƌoduĐts of soĐial 
structure rather than the presence or absence of individual attributes, such as 
iŶtelligeŶĐe, phǇsiĐal stƌeŶgth, aŶd so oŶ͟ ;MoƌgaŶ ϮϬϬ4: 167). Such essentialisms 
are often found at the nexus of war, militarism and gender. As Higate and Hopton 
(2004: 435) argue, support for military ethos-style activities such as the use of 
military drill and physical training in schools and the penal system, as ways to 
pƌepaƌe ǇouŶg ŵeŶ foƌ ͞laǁ-aďidiŶg adulthood͟, rely on the notion that anti-social 
ďehaǀiouƌ aƌises fƌoŵ ͞destƌuĐtiǀe ďiologiĐal uƌges that ŵilitaƌǇ-style discipline will 
eŶaďle theŵ to ĐoŶtƌol͟. Importantly, as they point out, this venerates militarism as 
͞the ultiŵate foƌŵ of disĐipliŶed ŵasĐuliŶitǇ͟ ;Higate & HoptoŶ ϮϬϬϰ).  
 
As men continue to constitute 89.1% of the UK regular armed forces, the likelihood is 
that ex-servicemen will dominate military ethos schemes. Furthermore, the majority 
of these men are likely to be white since only 7.1 % of members of the UK regular 
armed forces are of a minority ethnicity (MoD 2014). Such explicit prioritisation of 
male role models and implicit prioritisation of whiteness obscures the racial and 
gendered privileges that structure the British military and wider society (Ware 2012). 
As Chadderton (2014) points out, white supremacy already permeates the British 
education system which military ethos initiatives will reinforce; by sending 
pƌedoŵiŶaŶtlǇ ǁhite ǀeteƌaŶs iŶto ͚pƌoďleŵ͛ sĐhools ǁith high ĐoŶĐeŶtƌatioŶs of 
minority ethnic children, racialized stereotypes of unruliness and violence are 
confirmed, contributing to racialized essentialisms.   
 
The veneration of militarised masculinity is frequently drawn upon by proponents of 
military ethos initiatives.  Foƌ eǆaŵple the CeŶtƌe foƌ PoliĐǇ “tudies͛ ƌepoƌt goes oŶ 
to argue that ex-servicemen are:  
 
͞peƌĐeiǀed as haǀiŶg ŵade it iŶ a macho profession. Even though the 
individual soldier may not actually be proficient in combat, unarmed or 
otherwise…it is the image that counts. Whether we like it or not, children 
fƌoŵ ŵoƌe depƌiǀed Ŷeighďouƌhoods ofteŶ ƌespoŶd to ƌaǁ phǇsiĐal poǁeƌ͟ 
(Burkard 2008: 8). 
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This claim not only normalises the military as pro-typically masculine but also 
eŵďƌaĐes the idea that phǇsiĐal aggƌessioŶ is ͞paƌt of ;ŵaleͿ ǁoƌkiŶg-class youth 
culture and presents the armed services as a way of harnessing this rather than 
seekiŶg to doǁŶplaǇ the ǀalue of aggƌessioŶ͟ (Dermott 2012: 231; see also 
Messerschmidt 2005).  Though studies show that the British public grossly 
overestimates the involvement of children in crime (inter alia BaƌŶado͛s ϮϬϬϴ; FitĐh 
2009; Bawdon 2009) this has not prevented working-class boys from becoming 
BƌitaiŶ͛s latest ͚folk deǀils͛ (Cohen 2002). The Centre for Policy Studies report is 
peppeƌed ǁith ƌefeƌeŶĐes to ͚depƌiǀatioŶ͛ aŶd ͚ƌoughŶess͛ ĐloselǇ tied to low 
educational achievement and poor behaviour; the implications of this are that 
poverty breeds aggression and bad behaviour that then becomes grounds for 
intervention. Such logics are consistent with a neoliberal governmentality of 
austerity, self-reliance and individual merit;  it is ͞ďoǇs iŶ disadǀaŶtaged, ǁoƌkiŶg 
class communities who exhibit resistance to school [...who become] a problem in 
Ŷeed of a solutioŶ͟, and a militarised one at that, rather than the intersectional 
structures of classing, gendering and racializing that disadvantage these children 
(Dermott 2012: 229).  
  
MilitaƌǇ seƌǀiĐe has loŶg ďeeŶ ƌegaƌded as a pƌoĐess that ͚tuƌŶs ďoǇs iŶto ŵeŶ͛, aŶd 
as something that will improve the life chances of the ill-disciplined (inter alia 
Morgan 1987; Hockey 2003). However, in his critique of the role of the military in 
constructing cohesive national communities, Krebs (2004) argues that the impact of 
military training on individuals is often overstated. He points out that soldiers are not 
merely passive vehicles of military socialisation, and that military service is not 
ŶeĐessaƌilǇ the oŶlǇ oƌgaŶisiŶg pƌiŶĐiple iŶ soldieƌs͛ liǀes. Otheƌ featuƌes of soĐial life, 
such as having a family, civilian friends, non-military hobbies and so on, all suggest 
that the military is not all-encompassing. Military ethos initiatives rely precisely 
however, on a logic where having been socialised through military practices, culture 
and norms, individuals, with otherwise disparate skills and experiences, become 
uniquely qualified to teach. Though individuals who have served in the military may 
make excellent teachers, and indeed, whilst military service may have provided them 
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with suitable practical skills, in applying a broad-brush approach to what military 
peƌsoŶŶel ͚aƌe͛, the ŵilitaƌǇ ethos also effeĐtiǀelǇ ŵilitaƌises ǀeteƌaŶs, as well as the 
children it seeks to target for intervention. Such identity claims mean that soldiers do 
Ŷot haǀe to still ďe ͚iŶ͛ the ŵilitaƌǇ to ďe ͚of͛ it.  
 
Connell (1995:224) argues that military violence also ͞ƌeƋuiƌes ŵoƌe thaŶ oŶe kiŶd 
of ŵasĐuliŶitǇ͟; iŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ, the ͞geŶdeƌ pƌaĐtiĐe of the geŶeƌal is diffeƌeŶt fƌoŵ 
the practice of the front-line soldier, and armies acknowledge this by training them 
sepaƌatelǇ͟. MilitaƌǇ ethos initiatives, however, venerate all veterans vis-à-vis their 
military service, concealing the structural disadvantages between them in order to 
promote military service as a social good for all. Military socialisation and training 
has however, been shown to engender significant harm to individuals and social 
groups. For example, over half of UK military personnel surveyed in a recent study 
perceived their military career as having a negative impact on their children. Though 
reasons for this included hardships brought about by being divorced, separated or 
widowed, long and recurrent deployments and post-traumatic stress disorders were 
also associated by military personnel with negative impacts on their children (Rowe 
et al 2014). Excessive alcohol consumption is also more common than in the general 
population in the British military (Fear et al 2007) with servicemen in particular being 
͞likelǇ to dƌiŶk tǁiĐe as ŵuĐh alĐohol as ĐiǀiliaŶs͟ ;MoD ϮϬϬϴ:ϰͿ; and correlations 
have been found between acts of violence by military personnel on returning home 
and their holding a combat role (MacManus et al 2011).  
 
Moreover, it is unclear as to how loyalty, self-discipline and motivation have become 
͚eǆĐlusiǀe͛ to ŵilitaƌǇ aŶd eǆ-military personnel. Indeed, there is an endless list of 
individuals, as well as identifiable occupational groups, who inculcate such values 
including police officers, social workers, doctors, nurses, charity and aid workers, 
journalists, and even teachers! As Janowitz (1960:175) has also pointed out, though 
the ŵilitaƌǇ ĐaŶ ďe seeŶ as ͞a Đoŵplete stǇle of life͟, aŶǇ pƌofessioŶ ͞ǁhiĐh peƌfoƌŵs 
a ĐƌuĐial ͚life aŶd death͛ task, suĐh as ŵediĐiŶe…deǀelops suĐh Đlaiŵs͟. All military 
personnel ďeĐoŵe ǀehiĐles of ͞ǀalues ĐeŶtƌal to a suĐĐessful society such as loyalty, 
self-disĐipliŶe aŶd ŵotiǀatioŶ…that the ŶatioŶ͛s ĐhildƌeŶ ǁill thƌiǀe uŶdeƌ͟ for 
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military ethos proponents however (Fox in DfE 2011).  As ͚solutioŶs͛  to the ͚pƌoďleŵ͛ 
of how to make  working-class boys productive members of society, servicemen 
become more valuable still. Thus in an age of austerity, both children and soldiers 
are ŵade ͚docile͛ ďǇ the ŵilitaƌǇ ethos; that is to say, improved through their social 
and economic utility (Foucault 1991a). At the same time, the promotion of self-
reliance and individualism that engenders support for providing  ͚wayward youths͛ 
ǁith ďetteƌ life ͚ĐhoiĐes͛, insulates wider society from its role in reproducing the very 
structural inequalities that constitute that lack of life choices in the first place. As I 
will go on to argue, this has significant geopolitical as well as societal implications.     
 
Raising an Army  
Self-ƌeliaŶĐe also lies at the ĐeŶtƌe of the CoŶseƌǀatiǀe GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s ͚Big “oĐietǇ͛ 
initiative. The Big Society, which featured pƌoŵiŶeŶtlǇ iŶ the CoŶseƌǀatiǀe PaƌtǇ͛s 
ϮϬϭϬ ŵaŶifesto, is, foƌ its pƌopoŶeŶts all ͞aďout helpiŶg people to Đoŵe togetheƌ to 
iŵpƌoǀe theiƌ oǁŶ liǀes. It͛s aďout puttiŶg ŵoƌe poǁeƌ iŶ people͛s haŶds – a massive 
transfer of power from Whitehall to local commuŶities͟ ;CaďiŶet OffiĐe 2013). 
However, as Bulley and Sokhi-BulleǇ ;ϮϬϭϰ: ϰϱϮͿ aƌgue, its aiŵ aŶd effeĐt is ͞to 
produce a population of efficient, responsible, productive and self-governing 
iŶdiǀiduals aŶd ĐoŵŵuŶities͟. MilitaƌǇ ethos iŶitiatiǀes, iŶĐluding the veteran-led AP 
sĐheŵe “killFoƌĐe, haǀe ďeeŶ ideŶtified as ͚gƌeat eǆaŵples͛ of the ͞Big “oĐietǇ iŶ 
aĐtioŶ͟ that ͞ǁill alloǁ foƌŵeƌ “eƌǀiĐe peƌsoŶŶel to ŵake a ƌeal diffeƌeŶĐe to ǇouŶg 
peoples͛ liǀes͟ ;Foǆ iŶ DfE ϮϬϭϭͿ.  
 
As Bulley and Sokhi-Bulley (2014) have similarly shown in their analysis of the 
National Citizen Service - another Big Society initiative that also targets young people 
- military ethos initiatives seek to render bodies politically useful. In the case of 
children targeted for veteran-led interventions, strictly regulated military-style 
activities seek to transform the child into a productive member of the wider social 
aŶd politiĐal ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ. This faĐilitates the pƌoduĐtioŶ of paƌtiĐulaƌ ͚tƌuths͛ aďout 
both the ideal citizen and society. At the same time, idealising former soldiers as 
eǆpeƌts iŶ ͚pƌopeƌ͛ ĐoŶduĐt also dƌaǁs – in this case, martial - boundaries around the 
kinds of qualities and values that full members of society ought to embody. As has 
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long been the case, the majority of recruits to the lowest ranks of the British Army - 
the vast majority of whom are men - still come from the most socially and 
economically deprived backgrounds (Gee 2007). By targeting ͚pƌoďleŵ͛ children, 
coded through practices of racializing, gendering and class-making, through a logic of 
self-sufficiency, economic productivity and opportunity, military ethos initiatives 
enable the military continue to draw on those members of society who are often the 
most-disadvantaged to replenish its lowest ranks.  
 
Indeed, the aforementioned Centre for Policy “tudies͛ ƌepoƌt suggests that ŵilitaƌǇ 
ethos initiatives could ͞relieve the chronic recruiting problems faced by our armed 
forces͟ ;Buƌkaƌd, ϮϬϬϴ: ϵͿ.  What it fails to mention however, is that by targeting 
specific socio-economic groups for intervention, military ethos initiatives may be a 
significant recruiting tool for entry into the least well paid, and often the most 
dangerous, military roles. In the UK there are clear links between poverty and under-
attainment in education. For example, among pupils in secondary education, 
children eligible for free school meals are half as likely to achieve five or more GSCEs 
at grade A*–C, including English and maths, than children from wealthier 
backgrounds (Cabinet Office, UK 2010). To qualify for officer training, applicants 
require specific qualifications (see British Army 2015a) and over 80% of cadets at 
“aŶdhuƌst, the Bƌitish AƌŵǇ͛s OffiĐeƌ TƌaiŶiŶg College, aƌe uŶiǀeƌsitǇ graduates 
(British Army 2015bͿ. Without these ƋualifiĐatioŶs, appliĐaŶts eŶteƌ the ͚otheƌ͛ ƌaŶks 
of the British military.  
 
The highest concentration of non-qualified, working-class men in the British military 
is iŶ the AƌŵǇ͛s all-male infantry regiments, those units that engage enemies at close 
range (Beevor 1991; Gee 2007). As of 1 April 2014, there were 1570 under-18s in the 
Army, representing around 89% of all under-18s in the UK armed forces (MoD 2014). 
According to Child Soldiers International (2011), the UK operates the lowest military 
recruitment age in Europe and is the only permanent member of the UN Security 
Council to recruit 16 year-olds5. Following a spate of deaths of military recruits at 
                                                 
5 16 year-old recruits to the British Army have to serve a total minimum service period of six years; 17 
year-olds must serve for five. In October 2014, Child Soldiers International launched a judicial review 
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initial training establishments between 1995 and 2002, the UK Commons Select 
Committee on Defence (2005) conducted an extensive review of the MoD͛s dutǇ of 
Đaƌe to its ǇouŶgest ŵeŵďeƌs. The ƌeǀieǁ stated that ͚ĐoŶĐeƌŶs͛ ǁeƌe ƌaised ͞about 
the appropriateness͟ of recruiting under 18s and it was recommended that the MoD 
͞eǆaŵiŶe the poteŶtial iŵpaĐt of ƌaisiŶg the ƌeĐƌuitŵeŶt age foƌ all thƌee “eƌǀiĐes to 
ϭϴ͟ ;House of CoŵŵoŶs “eleĐt Coŵŵittee oŶ DefeŶĐe ϮϬϬϱ: ϳͿ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, iŶ the 
MoD͛s ;ϮϬϬϱa: ϭͿ ƌespoŶse, theǇ aƌgued that:  
 
͞The “eƌǀiĐes Ŷeed to attƌaĐt those uŶder 18 in order to compete effectively 
in an increasingly competitive employment market, and any move to increase 
the ŵiŶiŵuŵ ƌeĐƌuitiŶg age ǁould haǀe aŶ aĐute iŵpaĐt oŶ the “eƌǀiĐes͛ 
ability to meet their recruiting targets and hence operational commitmeŶts͟.  
 
Even in the current context of personnel reductions in the armed services, the 
ŵilitaƌǇ͛s Ŷeed to attƌaĐt uŶdeƌ-18s is unlikely to change. According to recent figures, 
the average age of officers in the British military is 37 years and the average age for 
personnel of other ranks is 30 years (MoD 2014). However, plans for the future 
armed forces of 2020 involve a more streamlined but rapidly deployable, 
expeditionary armed forces. In the Army, the infantry will play a key role and they 
typically recruit men aged between 18 and 24 years. As this demographic is set to 
decline across the UK by around 12% over the next decade (Hammond 2012), the 
imperative to attract  young men is likely to increase. Given that the British military 
are so reliant on young people, particularly young men, activities aimed at children 
that have a military component to them are clearly potential recruitment tools.  
 
SkillForce, a prominent AP veteran-staffed charity, began life as an MoD project that 
sent soldiers into classrooms in Newcastle and areas of Norfolk to assist pupils who 
ǁeƌe ƌegaƌded as ͞hard to ƌeaĐh͟ ;“killFoƌĐe ϮϬϭ5). Whilst some evaluations of the 
SkillForce model suggest that it can have a positive impact on attendance and 
behaviour in schools, students selected to participate in SkillForce activities ͞tǇpiĐallǇ 
                                                 
against the Ministry of Defence with the aim of reducing the minimum service for under-18s by up to 
two years.  
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dƌop tǁo GC“E suďjeĐts ǁhiĐh eƋuate to aƌouŶd tǁo half daǇs of iŶstƌuĐtioŶ a ǁeek͟ 
to foĐus oŶ aŶ ͚alteƌŶatiǀe ĐuƌƌiĐuluŵ͛ ;Hallaŵ et al 2007: 46). Such curricula 
tǇpiĐallǇ iŶĐlude ͞ƌesideŶtial tƌips, sports, outdoor pursuits, 
ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ/eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal pƌojeĐts aŶd Đlassƌooŵ ǁoƌk͟ ǁheƌe studeŶts leaƌŶ 
͞pƌaĐtiĐal life skills, e.g., Ŷuŵďeƌ haŶdliŶg iŶĐludiŶg uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg paǇ slips aŶd ďaŶk 
stateŵeŶts, ǁƌitiŶg ĐheƋues, ĐheĐkiŶg ĐhaŶge͟ ;Hallaŵ et al 2007: 47).  An 
archetypal activity on the SkillForce programme is to take pupils camping overnight, 
ǁhiĐh has ďeeŶ ƌepoƌted ďǇ paƌtiĐipaŶts to iŶǀolǀe ďeiŶg ͞giǀeŶ ƌatioŶ paĐks ǁhiĐh 
theǇ had to spƌead oǀeƌ Ϯϰ houƌs͟ leaƌŶiŶg to Đook foƌ theŵselǀes aŶd put up tents, 
to ǁalk ͞ϭϱ ŵiles iŶ tǁo daǇs͟ aŶd ĐaƌƌǇ out fiƌst aid ;Hallaŵ et al 2007: 47). These  
activities closely resemble those that British military cadets engage in; ͚Đap͛ aŶd 
͚field͛ Đƌaft also iŶĐludes fiƌst aid tƌaiŶiŶg aŶd ͞ďasiĐ teĐhŶiƋues of how to live and 
ŵoǀe iŶ a diffeƌeŶt eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt͟ that iŶĐlude leaƌŶiŶg ͞ hoǁ to pƌepaƌe ĐlothiŶg 
and equipment before embarking on an expedition [...] how to safely carry a load 
and identify a suitable route as well as what makes an ideal camp site [...] how to 
pitch a tent, cook a meal and build a latrine͟ (Army Cadet Force, UK 2015). They also 
eĐho the MoD͛s desiƌe to pƌoŵote aĐtiǀities iŶ sĐhool settings which focus on skills 
that ͞haǀe a diƌeĐt ďeaƌiŶg oŶ ŵilitaƌǇ ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶts͟ ;MoD ϮϬϬϱď: ϱͿ.  
 
As well as facilitating skills and exposure to military activities, culture and values that 
the MoD ƌegaƌds as esseŶtial to ŵaiŶtaiŶiŶg its ͚ŵaŶŶiŶg͛ leǀels, ŵilitaƌǇ ethos 
initiatives reinforce the two-tiered approach to schooling in the UK that has long 
entrenched socio-economic divides. As Young (2011: 273) argues, recent political 
stateŵeŶts oŶ eduĐatioŶ ŵiƌƌoƌ the assuŵptioŶs of alŵost eǀeƌǇ ͞eduĐatioŶal 
ƌepoƌt of the last ϭϱϬ Ǉeaƌs….that theƌe aƌe tǁo kiŶds of ŵiŶds – one practical and 
dƌaǁŶ to ͚the iŶtƌiŶsiĐ ƌiĐhŶess of ŵaŶual ǁoƌk͛ aŶd oŶe aĐadeŵiĐ͟. Paul Willis͛ 
(1977: 2) landmark study on how most working-class kids end up with working-class 
jobs suggests that foƌ ĐhildƌeŶ ƌegaƌded as uŶsuited to leaƌŶiŶg, the ͞ŵaiŶ ŵode of 
active connection with the world͟ is usuallǇ ͚pƌaĐtiĐal͛ Ŷot the aďstƌaĐt aŶd aĐadeŵiĐ 
;Willis ϭϵϳϳ:ϮͿ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, ǁheƌe pƌaĐtiĐal aďilitǇ is faƌ ŵoƌe ofteŶ ͞ƌiǀeted to 
paƌtiĐulaƌ pƌoduĐtiǀe pƌaĐtiĐes͟, ƋualifiĐatioŶs offeƌ the ŵeaŶs to deĐide ǁhiĐh 
productive practices to engage or not (Willis 1977: 56). This dichotomisation of 
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sĐhooliŶg ĐaŶ thus ĐhaŶŶel ĐhildƌeŶ iŶto the ͚Ƌualified͛ – those who are much more 
likely to attract the highest annual incomes - aŶd the ͚uŶƋualified͛ – those who tend 
to earn around 20 per cent less than those educated up to GCSE level (Office for 
National Statistics, UK 2011). For the latter, low-skilled jobs, that frequently lack 
fixed hours and incomes and often entail low and uncertain pay, are more likely 
(Green et al 2014).  
 
When the school leaving-age was raised in England in 1972, a chief concern for 
teaĐheƌs͛ uŶioŶs ǁas Ŷot hoǁ to deǀelop those ǁith pooƌeƌ disĐipliŶaƌǇ ƌeĐoƌds ďut 
hoǁ to eǆĐlude suĐh ͚tƌouďleŵakeƌs͛ fƌoŵ theiƌ Đlassƌooŵs ;Willis ϭϵϳϳͿ. MilitaƌǇ 
ethos initiatives rely on a very similar logic where some children are seen to require 
͞a tǇpe of sĐhooliŶg that is diffeƌeŶt fƌoŵ that of the ŵajoƌitǇ of pupils͟; ǁheƌeas 
the ŵajoƌitǇ of ĐhildƌeŶ aƌe seeŶ to ďe iŶ Ŷeed of ͞teaĐheƌs ǁho haǀe laƌge aŵouŶts 
of subject knowledge [...] a minority need discipline delivered by authoritarian role 
ŵodels͟ ;Deƌŵott ϮϬϭ2: 233). Many children who are referred for AP come from the 
most socio-economically deprived backgrounds (Taylor 2012) and on average, white 
children eligible for school meals tend to perform at a much lower level in education 
than their more affluent peers. As underachievement in education is now much 
ŵoƌe likelǇ to lead to ͚NEET͛ status i.e. Ŷot iŶ eduĐatioŶ, eŵploǇŵeŶt oƌ tƌaiŶiŶg 
(House of Commons Education Committee 2014), simplistic assumptions about the 
(un)suitability of children for different academic and disciplinary paths re-entrenches 
socio-economic divisions and prejudices, and obscures structural inequalities. As 
Baƌkeƌ͛s ;ϮϬϬϱ:ϱϱͿ ǁoƌk shoǁs, iŶ a ƌaŶge of diffeƌeŶt ŶatioŶal ĐoŶteǆts, suĐh soĐial 
exclusion, particularly in education, often leads young people, especially young men, 
to ͞iŶteƌŶalize the Ŷegatiǀe steƌeotǇpes otheƌs hold of theŵ͟. 
 
There is little room for aspiration or meritocracy in military ethos schemes therefore, 
despite the claims of its proponents - and little scope for decoupling presumptive 
links between low socio-economic status and ill-discipline, which are also often 
racially coded. One option that might become more appealing foƌ ͚pƌoďleŵ͛ ĐhildƌeŶ 
though is military service. As aforementioned, the military operates a two-tier entry 
system, however, ǁheƌe those ǁithout ƋualifiĐatioŶs eŶteƌ the ͚otheƌ ƌaŶks͛ aŶd 
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those with qualifications enter as officer cadets. Given that veteran-led AP activities 
may displace the pursuit of traditional qualifications, entry into the armed forces 
would be at the lower levels for most. These roles are generally more hazardous – 
87% of British soldiers killed in Afghanistan and Iraq between October 2001 and May 
ϮϬϭϮ ďeloŶged to the ͚otheƌ ƌaŶks͛. The Infantry, though only a small part of the 
overall Army, suffered the highest fatality rates in Afghanistan. It is a far more 
popular destination for school-leavers than adult enlistees and soldiers who joined 
the Army at age 16 were approximately 50% more likely to die as a consequence of 
deployment to Afghanistan than those who enlisted as adults (Gee & Goodman 
2013). Moƌeoǀeƌ, the ŵilitaƌǇ͛s tǁo-tier entry system not only sustains pre-military 
class inequalities but entrenches them. It ensures that soldiers re-enter the labour 
market with skills for low-status jobs and officers re-enter it with skills geared 
towards higher-status positions (Levy 1998; Joyce 1998). In short, military ethos 
iŶitiatiǀes ŵaǇ ďe fƌaŵed as a ͚solutioŶ͛ to the ͚pƌoďleŵ͛ of tƌouďlesoŵe ǁoƌkiŶg-
class kids but they risk reinforcing a geopolitical status quo where wars are fought by 
soĐietǇ͛s ŵost ǀulŶeƌaďle ŵeŵďeƌs in the effort to make theŵ ͚pƌoduĐtiǀe͛ ĐitizeŶs.  
 
Support the Troops 
In recent years, there has been much public criticism of state support for members 
of the armed forces, particularly injured veterans (NatCen Social Research 2012). 
Veteran organisations such as the Royal British Legion (RBL) have even called for 
veterans to receive healthcare and support outside the regular welfare system (RBL 
2006), and the founding of the Help for Heroes charity in 2007 occurred amid 
political controversies about veteran care and equipment for deployed troops. In the 
saŵe Ǉeaƌ, the ‘BL lauŶĐhed aŶ ͚HoŶouƌ the CoǀeŶaŶt͛ ĐaŵpaigŶ, which refers to a 
pact said to have existed between the military, individual soldiers, state and society 
since time immemorial. The Covenant calls upon soldiers to make personal sacrifices, 
including foregoing some of the rights enjoyed by civilians in wider society, and to 
make the ultimate sacrifice for said society if necessary, echoing claims about the 
essence of the military ethos. In exchange, state and society must ensure soldiers 
ĐaŶ ͞eǆpeĐt faiƌ tƌeatŵeŶt͟; that theǇ aƌe ͞sustaiŶed aŶd ƌeǁaƌded ďǇ 
ĐoŵŵeŶsuƌate teƌŵs aŶd ĐoŶditioŶs of seƌǀiĐe͟ aŶd that the ŵilitaƌǇ iŶstitutioŶ 
 18 
ŵust also ͚ďe sustaiŶed aŶd pƌoǀided foƌ aĐĐoƌdiŶglǇ ďǇ the ŶatioŶ͛ ;Bƌitish AƌŵǇ 
2000, 1.2). 
 
Ingham (2014, 4) argues the Covenant, and its proponents, have had a significant 
impact on British civil-military relations; despite strong opposition to the 2003 
invasion of Iraq in particular, the "public came to separate the men and women from 
the ŵissioŶs aŶd ƌallied to ͚our boys͛ (and our girls), giving them unprecedented 
levels of moral and material support͟. Moƌeoǀeƌ, as TidǇ ;ϮϬϭϱ: ϮͿ aƌgues, the 
proliferation of military charities, in the wake of troop downscaling and withdrawals 
from recent British wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, has engendered a form of 
͞ĐoŶsĐieŶĐe Đapitalisŵ͟ that has pƌoduĐed ͞the ĐoŶteŵpoƌaƌǇ Bƌitish ŵilitaƌǇ as a 
ŶotioŶallǇ apolitiĐal soĐial ͚Đause͛, ƌeŶdeƌed iŶtelligiďle ǁithiŶ the teƌŵs of eǆistiŶg 
commoditized disĐouƌses͟. IŶ ƌeĐeŶt Ǉeaƌs ŵilitaƌǇ peƌsoŶŶel haǀe ďeeŶ lauded foƌ 
providing strike cover for firefighters in 2002-2003 and for providing security for the 
London 2012 Olympics. As Evans (2012) argues of the OlǇŵpiĐ ͚deploǇŵeŶt͛, if it had 
͞happeŶed iŶ Noƌth Korea or Iran, politicians would have undoubtedly lambasted 
the despotiĐ state of ŵilitaƌǇ affaiƌs͟ ďut the Bƌitish puďliĐ failed ͞to ƋuestioŶ ǁhat it 
means to live in a time when the distinctions between war and peace, global and 
local, private and publiĐ, soldieƌ aŶd ĐitizeŶ, ďluƌ͟.  
As IŶghaŵ͛s ;ϮϬϭϰ, ϰͿ eǆhaustiǀe studǇ of the CoǀeŶaŶt suggests, the foĐus oŶ ͞the 
ďƌokeŶ MilitaƌǇ CoǀeŶaŶt͟ ďǇ ŵilitaƌǇ Đhaƌities, the populaƌ pƌess aŶd civil society, 
͞iŵpeded aŶǇ oďjeĐtiǀe assessŵeŶt of ŵilitaƌǇ peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe iŶ IƌaƋ oƌ AfghaŶistaŶ͟. 
Likewise, in making veterans a charitable social cause, their role in state-sanctioned 
violence is obscured. At the same time, growing support for military involvement in 
strike-cover, security at sporting events, and military-ethos style initiatives suggest 
the militaristic veneration of military personnel and the military institution above 
what is strictly necessary for defence (Strachan 1997). Though typically, such societal 
suppoƌt foƌ ŵilitaƌǇ ͚solutioŶs͛ to soĐial ͚pƌoďleŵs͛ has ďeeŶ ideŶtified as indicative 
of ͚militarization͛, this concept often implies something being done to society by the 
military. Society, hoǁeǀeƌ, ͞has always been organized through the use of violence. 
What changes are the mechanisms by and extent to which this occurs in a given 
spatial aŶd teŵpoƌal ĐoŶteǆt͟ ;BeƌŶazzoli & FliŶt ϮϬϬϵ: ϰϱϬ). The introduction of 
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military ethos programmes in the UK thus needs to be considered in the context of a 
growing popular and elite support for the military, an institution for which state 
violence has become one function among many. Militarism is not imposed; it 
eŵeƌges ďeĐause Điǀil soĐietǇ is ͞ďoth aŶ oďjeĐt aŶd a suďjeĐt of goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͟ 
(Sending & Neumann 2006: 652). In an age of self-ƌeliaŶĐe, the ͚self-saĐƌifiĐe͛ of 
military personnel becomes more resonant and venerable, and in the midst of 
austerity-driven  concerns over ǁaǇǁaƌd, uŶpƌoduĐtiǀe Ǉouths the ŵilitaƌǇ͛s 
seeŵiŶg ͚success͛ in solving other social problems, lends support to military ethos 
initiatives. In each instance, these everyday practices, which oďsĐuƌe the ŵilitaƌǇ͛s 
core violent function, facilitate its application by fostering less-questioning popular 
support for the armed forces.  
 
By constituting the military as a core institution of society and its values as moral and 
good foƌ BƌitaiŶ͛s ĐhildƌeŶ, ŵilitaƌǇ ethos iŶitiatiǀes oďsĐuƌe the ŵilitaƌǇ͛s violent 
functions but they may also engender material, as well as moral, support for the 
armed forces. The requirement to fulfil the Covenant, particularly in a time of 
defence cuts and very high popular support for the British armed forces (McCartney 
2010; Ware, 2010; Gribble et al 2012), also means that military ethos initiatives, in 
providing government-subsidised employment opportunities exclusively for 
veterans, provide aŶotheƌ ǁaǇ to ͚suppoƌt the tƌoops͛. As relatively inexpensive 
͚ƋuiĐk-fiǆ͛ aŶd pieĐeŵeal iŶteƌǀeŶtioŶs Đaƌƌied out ďǇ ǀeteƌaŶs iŶto the liǀes of 
͚pƌoďleŵ kids͛, ŵilitaƌǇ ethos iŶitiatiǀes Ŷot oŶlǇ pƌoŵote self-reliance among 
disadvantaged children but also veterans, at a time when cuts to social and military 
spending may be re-entrenching more structurally-embedded disadvantages for 
both social groups. Indeed, one possible explanation for ongoing funding for military 
ethos initiatives is to provide much-needed job opportunities for veterans. In a 
report on the future welfare needs of the ex-Service community up to 2020, the RBL 
(2006) found that unemployment among 18–49 year old veterans is often around 
twice that of the national average.  
 
The original US Troops to Teachers programme was essentially set up by the Clinton 
Administration to provide veterans of the first Gulf War with employment. In a 
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period of ongoing global recession, Democrats and Republicans recently joined 
togetheƌ to pƌopose a ďipaƌtisaŶ ͚Tƌoops to TeaĐheƌs EŶhaŶĐeŵeŶt AĐt͛ to iŶĐƌease 
annual state funding to the scheme (from around $30 million to $50 million) and to 
decrease the period of active service veterans have to undertake to be eligible for 
teacher training. In the UK, similar concerns over unemployment among soldiers, 
particularly those returning from Afghanistan, have coincided with the introduction 
of T2T on this side of the Atlantic. In October 2010, following the Strategic Defence 
and Security Review, the MoD announced that it would be cutting personnel figures 
by 17,000 by April 2015 across all three Armed Services, partly through decreases in 
recruitment, but also through phased redundancies. Creating opportunities for some 
veterans through T2T and AP schemes appears responsive to public concerns about 
veteran welfare therefore. By venerating military training and values as 
͚tƌaŶsfeƌƌaďle͛ assets, ŵilitaƌǇ ethos iŶitiatiǀes also ensure that veterans come to be 
seen as remaining socially, economically and politically productive. Military ethos 
iŶitiatiǀes theƌefoƌe faĐilitate austeƌitǇ͛s atteŶdaŶt logiĐs of self-reliance whilst 
concealing the impact of spending cuts on veterans, as well as children.  
 
Concluding Comments 
For proponents of military ethos initiatives, including the UK Government, its value 
lies in raising the quality of teaching to engender schooling based on self-discipline, 
self-reliance and economic productivity. This reflects a particular inflection of 
neoliberal governmentality that not only denigrates the contributions of existing 
public sector educators, but promotes a neoliberal, masculine, militarised and 
individualistic account of social relations (Mendick 2012) that legitimises both 
austerity and warfare. Proponents of the Troops to Teachers programme suggest it 
ǁill offeƌ ĐhildƌeŶ ͞fƌoŵ soŵe of the ŵost disadǀaŶtaged ďaĐkgƌouŶds, disĐipliŶe, 
self-ƌespeĐt aŶd a seŶse of puƌpose͟ ;Goǀe iŶ DfE 2011) but a closer look at the 
scheme reveals how the supposed ill-discipline of working-class children, especially 
boys, is constructed through practices of class-making, gendering and racializing that 
elide structural inequalities and promote military values and military service as a 
means of bettering oneself. In an age of austerity, the potential danger and disorder 
posed by economically unproductive youths is heightened and the social imperative 
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to Đaƌe foƌ oŶeself ;FouĐault ϮϬϬϱͿ, leŶds suppoƌt to this ŵilitaƌised ͚solutioŶ͛ to a 
soĐial ͚pƌoďleŵ͛.  
 
In the age of austerity, there is no room for transformative structural change, only 
͚peƌsoŶal gƌoǁth͛. BǇ pƌoŵotiŶg ǀeteƌaŶs as ǀessels of ǀalues that will translate into 
social mobility, by positing military service as a social good and a potential career 
opportunity for the most disadvantaged, military ethos initiatives risk limiting the life 
chances, in both a figurative and literal sense, of socio-economically underprivileged 
children. They equip children characterised as unsuited to academic learning with 
skills that would be valuable to the armed forces at a time when the MoD needs to 
recruit young people, particularly young men, to sustain its warfighting capacity, 
whilst making other military personnel redundant through defence spending cuts. 
Military ethos initiatives also allow the state to be seen to be alleviating the impact 
of these cuts however, by providing much-needed jobs in education for a small 
number of veterans. In a context where public support for the armed forces has 
iŶĐƌeased, despite oŶgoiŶg ĐoŶĐeƌŶs oǀeƌ the ŵilitaƌǇ͛s iŶǀolǀeŵeŶt iŶ ƌeĐeŶt ǁaƌs 
and potential future operations, the state can show it has honoured the military 
CoǀeŶaŶt, diǀeƌtiŶg atteŶtioŶ fƌoŵ the legitiŵaĐǇ of the UK͛s geopolitiĐal aĐtioŶs.  
 
In recent years, British civil society has exhibited forms of veneration towards the 
ŵilitaƌǇ that eǆĐeed that ͚ŶeĐessaƌǇ͛ foƌ defeŶĐe ;“tƌaĐhaŶ 1997). Indeed, that 
veneration has often been separated out from defence altogether to celebrate the 
ŵilitaƌǇ͛s ƌesĐue of the ϮϬϭϮ OlǇŵpiĐs ďǇ pƌoǀidiŶg last-minute security for the event 
or by focusing on the perceived benefits of military training for instilling discipline in 
young people. As Gilmore (2012) argues, it is vital to remember that military 
͞tƌaiŶiŶg aŶd disĐipliŶe ĐaŶŶot ďe disĐoŶŶeĐted fƌoŵ its ƌole iŶ pƌepaƌiŶg iŶdiǀiduals 
foƌ oďedieŶĐe to the ĐhaiŶ of ĐoŵŵaŶd, uŶƋuestioŶiŶg aĐĐeptaŶĐe of oƌdeƌs͟ aŶd 
iŶdeed, ͞ultiŵately, conditioning them to overcome the moral prohibition on killing 
otheƌ huŵaŶ ďeiŶgs͟. Hoǁeǀeƌ, the assuŵptioŶ that a ŵilitaƌǇ ďaĐkgƌouŶd 
immediately qualifies someone to provide young people with discipline, self-respect 
and a sense of purpose not only disregards the violent function of these values, it 
also has the effect of legitimising this violence when exerted in the so-called 
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͚disĐipliŶed͛ eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt of the aƌŵed foƌĐes. When participating in military-style 
activities is framed as a way to improve the lot of the working classes, militarism 
thƌiǀes; aŶd ŵilitaƌǇ ǀioleŶĐe ƌisks ďeĐoŵiŶg a distiŶĐtlǇ ͚ŵoƌal aĐtiǀitǇ͛. The fƌaŵiŶg 
of ŵilitaƌǇ ethos iŶitiatiǀes as a ͚solutioŶ͛ to the oǀeƌestiŵated soĐial pƌoďleŵ of 
failing working class children, and especially boys, thus serves military agendas more 
than most.  
 
In examining the various assumptions that underpin military ethos initiatives, I have 
tried to suggest that it is imperative to think therefore about how war, as a 
geopolitical practice, is made possible by enactments and negotiations of militarism 
and violence in everyday life, including through such schemes. As Back (2015: 834) 
aƌgues, ͞the eǀeƌǇdaǇ ŵatteƌs ďeĐause it offeƌs the oppoƌtuŶitǇ to liŶk the sŵallest 
story to the largest social transfoƌŵatioŶ͟; it alloǁs us to see the ǁideƌ issues that 
͞aƌe aliǀe iŶ the ŵuŶdaŶe aspeĐts eǀeƌǇdaǇ life͟. Populist aŶd elite suppoƌt foƌ the 
military, and for military ethos initiatives, offer us a glimpse into some of the 
processes that make war possible. Liberal democracy is founded on the dream of a 
fƌee ďut oƌdeƌed aŶd ͞seĐuƌe͟ soĐietǇ. This dƌeaŵ ƌeƋuiƌes that some bodies are 
regulated and trained to fight wars, and that other bodies are disciplined or 
͚ŵilitaƌised͛ to suppoƌt theŵ ;FouĐault ϭϵϵϭb). What I have aimed to demonstrate 
through my exploration of military ethos initiatives as a practice of neoliberal 
governmentality is that they normalise violence and militarism in everyday life. By 
targeting children, especially boys from disadvantaged backgrounds racialized in 
different ways, as potential future soldiers or as disciplined, martial subjects, and by 
promoting military values as a social good beneficial to wider society, military ethos 
initiatives engender subjectivities that provide the very political, social economic and 
practical conditions of possibility for war.  
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